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Watching Out for the Watchdogs:
Why a Job Duties Exception to Whistleblower Protection Makes Bad Policy
Alex Smith*
I.

Introduction

On May 15, 2006, Joel S. Lippman, M.D., was fired because—if his allegations are to be
believed—he had faithfully executed his responsibilities.1 For over fifteen years, Dr. Lippman
worked in the fields of pharmaceutical and medical device manufacture in various directorial and
executive capacities.2 In 2000, Dr. Lippman began working for Ethicon, a manufacturer of medical
devices used in surgical procedures, where he served first as vice president of medical affairs and
then, later, as the worldwide vice president of medical affairs and the company’s chief medical
officer.3 Dr. Lippman’s job duties were expansive and required him to serve on a number of
internal review boards, providing his medical opinions and expertise on the safety of medical
devices as well as their compliance with pertinent federal and state laws and regulations.4 One of
these review boards, known as the quality board, had significant power over the distribution of
Ethicon’s medical devices, wielding the “final say” over whether any corrective actions were to
be taken with regard to any of the products.5
As the chief medical officer, Dr. Lippman’s urged the quality board to exercise caution and
restraint, recommending on numerous occasions that Ethicon refrain from beginning or continuing
to market different products which Dr. Lippman deemed medically unsafe.6 Some of the other
members of the quality board were driven by competing motivations, representing the business
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side of the company, and accordingly disagreed with and pushed back against Dr. Lippman’s
suggestions.7 Dr. Lippman relied on his medical expertise, his many years of experience in the
field, and his understanding of the laws governing Ethicon’s various products.8 He believed that
it was his responsibility to “candidly and forthrightly express his opinions and concerns about the
safety of a product.”9 Shortly before his termination, Dr. Lippman engaged in another of these
quality board reviews, urging his colleagues that a product referred to as DFK-24 should be
recalled.10 In his opinion, the product was dangerous.11 Although other members of the board
were resistant, Ethicon ultimately followed Dr. Lippman’s suggestion and recalled the product in
either late April or early May 2006.12 Within a couple of weeks of the recall, on May 15, 2006,
Dr. Lippman’s employment was terminated.13
In 2006, Sherilyn McCoy served as the Ethicon’s company group chairperson and was Dr.
Lippman’s direct superior and the person to whom he reported.14 According to McCoy, Dr.
Lippman was terminated because of an allegedly inappropriate romantic relationship that he had
engaged in with a female subordinate, though one who did not report directly to Dr. Lippman.15
Ms. McCoy acknowledged that this justification was not one which, to her knowledge, had ever
been used to terminate or even discipline an Ethicon employee before.16 Ms. McCoy also stated
that she was unaware of any written policy prohibiting that type of consensual romantic
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relationship.17 Dr. Lippman contends that the purported rationale for his firing was illusory and
that Ethicon’s true motivation was to remove what they had come to view as an obstacle standing
between the company and greater profitability.18
Whether or not Dr. Lippman was removed in retaliation for his good faith efforts to alert
his employer to the risks its products posed to society at large is open for debate. The factual
record has not been fully developed and the case has yet to be resolved. 19 What should not be
debatable, however, is that people in Dr. Lippman’s position—watchdog employees—must be
protected by laws intended to encourage employees to take action when they see their employers
violating laws or putting the public in danger. In Lippman v. Ethicon, the New Jersey Supreme
Court found this to be the case.20
This Comment will examine how various states have addressed the question of whether or
not watchdog employees should be afforded whistleblower protections. Part II will examine the
whistleblower protection statute in New Jersey and how it was applied in Lippman. Part III will
look at how some other states have reached the opposite result from New Jersey in interpreting
their own whistleblower protection statutes. Part IV will look at some further states that have
interpreted their whistleblower protection statutes in line with New Jersey. Part V will study how
the federal government has addressed the problem, and how its treatment of this issue has evolved
over time. Part VI addresses the job duties exception to free speech protection for federal
employees, as well as the thorny issues raised by the attorney whistleblower. Finally, Part VII will
conclude and recommend what the states currently in opposition to New Jersey’s approach should
do going forward. In total, this Comment will argue that failing to afford whistleblower protection
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to watchdog employees is plainly contrary to the public policy rationales underlying whistleblower
protection legislation.
II.

Whistleblower Protection in New Jersey

A. Conscientious Employee Protection Act
The New Jersey Supreme Court first addressed whistleblower protection in the 1980 case
of Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.21 In that case, the court engaged in a discussion of the
development of a common law cause of action for the wrongful discharge of an at-will employee
in situations which constituted a clear violation of public policy.22 Though the plaintiff in that case
was ultimately unsuccessful, the court explicitly endorsed the approach.23 In 1986, the New Jersey
state legislature directly codified this decision in the passage of the Conscientious Employee
Protection Act (CEPA).24 The statute, in pertinent part, provides:
An employer shall not take any retaliatory action against an
employee because the employee does any of the following:
a. Discloses, or threatens to disclose to a supervisor or to a public
body an activity, policy or practice of the employer or another
employer, with whom there is a business relationship, that the
employee reasonably believes:
(1) is in violation of a law, or a rule or regulation promulgated
pursuant to law, including any violation involving deception of, or
misrepresentation to, any shareholder, investor, client, patient,
customer, employee, former employee, retiree or pensioner of the
employer or any governmental entity, or, in the case of an employee
who is a licensed or certified health care professional, reasonably
believes constitutes improper quality of patient care;
(2) is fraudulent or criminal, including any activity, policy or
practice of deception or misrepresentation which the employee
reasonably believes may defraud any shareholder, investor, client,
patient, customer, employee, former employee, retiree or pensioner
of the employer or any governmental entity;
b. Provides information to, or testifies before, any public body
conducting an investigation, hearing or inquiry into any violation of
21

Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 417 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1980).
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law, or a rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to law by the
employer or another employer, with whom there is a business
relationship, or, in the case of an employee who is a licensed or
certified health care professional, provides information to, or
testifies before, any public body conducting an investigation,
hearing or inquiry into the quality of patient care; or
c. Objects to, or refuses to participate in any activity, policy or
practice which the employee reasonably believes:
(1) is in violation of a law, or a rule or regulation promulgated
pursuant to law, including any violation involving deception of, or
misrepresentation to, any shareholder, investor, client, patient,
customer, employee, former employee, retiree or pensioner of the
employer or any governmental entity, or, if the employee is a
licensed or certified health care professional, constitutes improper
quality of patient care;
(2) is fraudulent or criminal including any activity, policy or practice
of deception or misrepresentation which the employee reasonably
believes may defraud any shareholder, investor, client, patient,
customer, employee, former employee, retiree or pensioner of the
employer or any governmental entity; or
(3) is incompatible with a clear mandate of public policy concerning
the public health, safety or welfare or protection of the
environment.25
This provision of CEPA, known as “Employer retaliatory action; protected employee actions,”
provides protection for employees who attempt to enforce mandates, either of public policy or
those expressly created by judicial decision or statute.26
CEPA is an example of what has come to be known as a whistleblower statute.27
Whistleblower statutes fall under a category of legislation known as remedial legislation, laws
intended to provide a remedy for plaintiffs who have suffered what society views as an injustice.28
In order to bring about the important social goals of remedial legislation, courts must construe
remedial laws in as liberal a way as their words allow, to give the legislation as broad an effect as
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possible.29 Accordingly, any time an employee speaks up about workplace conditions or practices
that are either unsafe or unlawful, courts should strive to interpret whistleblower statutes like
CEPA to provide the employee with protection from retaliatory action by the employer.30
In order to prove a claim under CEPA, the plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of four
factors connected with the termination:
(1) that he . . . reasonably believed that his . . . employer's conduct
was violating either a law or a rule or regulation promulgated
pursuant to law; (2) that he . . . performed whistle-blowing activity
described in N.J.S.A. 34:19-3a, c(1) or c(2); (3) an adverse
employment action was taken against him . . . ; and (4) a causal
connection exists between the whistle-blowing activity and the
adverse employment action.31
Under this standard, an employee can receive protection, even if the conduct he objected to was
not unlawful.32 However, it must have been reasonable to believe that the conduct violated some
law or regulation, and the employee must have actually believed as such. 33 In this narrow way,
the employee’s purpose in blowing the whistle should be considered.
B. Application of CEPA to Watchdog Employees in Lippman
Against this backdrop, the New Jersey Supreme Court addressed whether CEPA’s
protection was meant to be extended to so-called watchdog employees.34 A watchdog employee
is an employee whose job duties and responsibilities explicitly require them to regularly engage in
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the type of activity that whistleblower statutes seek to encourage.35 If your job requires you to
engage in behavior that would otherwise constitute whistleblowing, you are a watchdog
employee.36

Some common types of watchdog employees include compliance officers,

ombudsmen,37 in-house council, internal auditors,38 and, broadly, many individuals involved in
the medical field.39 This last category is perhaps the most significant, as it pertains directly to the
health, safety, and well-being of individuals and our society at large.40 It was in this category that
Dr. Lippman found himself.
In determining whether or not Dr. Lippman and watchdog employees in general fall within
CEPA’s protection, the court analyzed the language of the statute, specifically the use of the
language “an employee.”41 The court noted that employee was defined within CEPA as “any
individual who performs services for and under the control and direction of an employer for wages
or other remuneration.”42 In addition to this clear definition, and the absence of any type of
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39
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to be whistleblowers . . . .”); Frank J. Cavico & Nancy M. Cavico, Employment-at-Will, Public Policy, and the
Nursing Profession, 8 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 161 (2005) (discussing the profession of nursing and how the
members of the profession face ethical and professional responsibilities to report misconduct). See also Herbert G.
Ogden, The Public Policy Exception to At-Will Employment, 34 VT. B.J., Fall 2008, at 44, 45–47 (discussing that in
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whistleblower protection).
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See Cavico, supra note 39, at 238 (arguing that courts should take an expansive view of the public policy
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limiting language, the court also acknowledged that remedial legislation such as CEPA must be
liberally construed.43 Taking these considerations together, and noting the total absence of any
evidence within the statute to the contrary, the court found that any construction of CEPA that
would limit its application to any subset of “employees” would be contrary to legislative intent
and invalid.44 As such, the court found that watchdog employees were entitled to whistleblower
protection, on the same terms as all other employees.45
C. The New Jersey Supreme Court’s Failure to Enunciate a Public Policy Rationale
While this opinion certainly stands as a victory for watchdog employees and a vindication
of legislative purpose and intent, the New Jersey Supreme Court could have taken this opportunity
to go further, vehemently emphasizing the public policy rationale which supported the decision.
As the lower court found in its separate published opinion, watchdog employees are not merely
within the protections offered by CEPA, they are precisely the sort of employee who need the
protection the most.46 Their jobs require them to regularly, and in some cases constantly, make
reports or findings to their employers that cut against the employer’s financial interests. It is easy
to see why the appeals court described these employees as “most vulnerable to retaliation.”47 The
New Jersey Supreme Court’s failure to explicitly endorse this view is not an infirmity to the
decision. The statutory construction argument on which the court relied was simple, seemingly
self-evident, and entirely conclusive on the issue. No New Jersey court will have any difficulty
applying the rule set forth in the decision. However, by not making the policy argument, the
decision loses some of its potential instructive force.

43

Id.; see also supra notes 27–30 and accompanying text.
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CEPA is not unique. Many states have whistleblower statutes that—though not going as
far in their coverage48—are substantially similar to it in language, purpose, and effect. At the time
of its passage, just under three decades ago, CEPA was the most comprehensive whistleblower
statute in the nation, serving as a frontrunner in the field of employee protection. 49 In the years
since its passage, many other states have enacted similar legislation.50 In interpreting this
legislation, as will be detailed below, the courts of some of these other states have reached contrary
results on the status of watchdog employees.51 In Lippman, the New Jersey Supreme Court missed
an opportunity to more fully enunciate the strong public policy rationale for including watchdog
employees under whistleblower protection statutes. While such a discussion would not have added
clarity or ease to the application of the decision within the state, it would have expanded its efficacy
for other states wishing to look to New Jersey in interpreting their own statutes.
III.

States Where Whistleblower Protection Has Been Constricted

A. Minnesota
In 1987, Minnesota’s legislature created a whistleblower statute intended to discourage
illegal conduct by employers, encourage whistleblowing activity, and provide employees
engaging in such activity with some protection.52 This statute, the Minnesota Whistleblower Act
(MWA), provides that:

See Dellatore, supra note 26, at 377 (describing CEPA as “one of the broadest whistleblower statutes in the
country when it was enacted and . . . still one of the most expansive”).
49
Lippman, 75 A.3d at 451.
50
See, e.g., Marshall H. Tanick, Blow the Whistle, Sound the Drum, 63 BENCH & B. MINN., Oct. 2006, at 18, 20
(discussing that “[a]ll 50 state jurisdictions and the District of Colombia now recognize whistleblower rights . . .
usually . . . based on ‘public policy’ grounds . . . or statutory provisions”).
51
See generally Nancy M. Modesitt, The Garcetti Virus, 80 U. CINN. L. REV. 137, 162–77 (2011) (outlining the
growth of the job duty exception to state whistleblower statutes since 2006).
52
See Steven Andrew Smith et al., The Canary Sings Again: New Life for the Minnesota Whistleblower Act, 70
BENCH & B. MINN., Sep. 2013, at 14, 15 (describing some of the “self-evident” purposes of the MWA as
encouraging whistleblowing and “dissuad[ing] employers from engaging in, or continuing to engage in, illegal
behavior”).
48

An employer shall not discharge, discipline, threaten, otherwise
discriminate against, or penalize an employee regarding the
employee's compensation, terms, conditions, location, or privileges
of employment because:
(1) the employee, or a person acting on behalf of an employee, in
good faith, reports a violation, suspected violation, or planned
violation of any federal or state law or common law or rule adopted
pursuant to law to an employer or to any governmental body or law
enforcement official. . .53
Like New Jersey, the Minnesota legislature defined employee in an expansive way, providing that
employee, for purposes of this section, “means a person who performs services for hire in
Minnesota for an employer.”54 The use of the phrase “good faith” in this statute is the only notable
difference between this language and the language of CEPA.55 The Minnesota courts have found
that the legislature’s inclusion of this phrase requires analysis of whistleblower claims to consider
the purpose and intent of the purported whistleblower.56 The path the courts took to reach this
conclusion is worth detailing.
1. The Good Faith Requirement
The importance of the “good faith” language first came to light in Obst v. Microtron, Inc.57
In that case, the plaintiff, Michael Obst, asserted that he had been terminated due to his reporting
activity and sought a remedy under the whistleblower statute.58 Obst’s employer Microtron, was

53

MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.932 (West 2013).
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reckless disregard of the truth.” Minn. Stat. Ann. § 181.932 (West 2013). This change will be discussed further
below.
56
Obst v. Microtron, Inc. 614 N.W.2d 196, 202 (Minn. 2000) (“In order to determine whether a report of a violation
or a suspected violation of law is made in good faith, we must look not only at the content of the report, but also at
the reporter’s purpose in making the report.”).
57
Id.
58
Id. at 199 (“Obst believed that . . . the actual reason [for his termination] was the fact that he reported what he
thought were violations of law to Microtron.”).
54

a manufacturer of wiper blades for Ford Motor Company. 59 According to its contract with Ford,
Microtron was required to quality test the wiper blades, using multiple machines to do so, prior to
shipping them to the Ford assembly plants.60 Obst complained to his superiors that one of the
testing machines was not functioning and that, as a result, faulty wiper blades were being shipped
on to Ford.61 Microtron eventually addressed the problem, but not until after Ford had voiced its
own concerns over the quality of the wiper blades it had been receiving.62 Shortly thereafter, Obst
was terminated.63

This termination was purportedly for Obst’s inability to effectively

communicate with peers, despite having recently received a raise and universally positive
performance reviews.64 Obst alleged that he had been terminated for complaining about the
company’s deviation from their quality control plan with Ford.65
Ultimately, Obst’s complaints either covered violations that were already generally known,
or did not involve a violation of any law or regulation, and so the court found that Obst was not
covered by the MWA.66 In arriving at this conclusion, the court discussed the meaning of the
phrase “good faith” in the whistleblower statute for the first time.67 The court described the good
faith analysis as a “critical question,” going on to provide clarity on what the question was, stating
“we must look not only at the content of the report, but also at the reporter's purpose in making the
report.”68 To support this contention, the court did not cite any Minnesota case law. Instead, the
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Id. at 198–99.
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Id. at 199.
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Obst, 614 N.W.2d at 199.
63
Id. (noting that, “[o]n June 1, 1995, Microtron terminated Obst’s employment,” about three and a half months
after Ford first voiced concerns about the wiper blade quality “[o]n or about February 17, 1995”).
64
Id.
65
See supra note 58.
66
Obst, 614 N.W.2d at 204.
67
See Smith, supra note 52, at 15 (explaining that “[t]he narrow interpretation of ‘good faith’ began when courts
held that whistleblowers had to prove they were ‘blowing the whistle’ for the ‘purpose of exposing an illegality,’”
and citing to Obst).
68
Obst, 614 N.W.2d at 202.
60

court relied on a district court case from Michigan.69 This was the only support offered to elucidate
the content of the “critical question” and to establish that a whistleblower’s purpose is of
paramount importance.
The court’s reliance on Wolcott was misguided, because Wolcott’s facts are distinguishable
from those of Obst.70 In Wolcott, the plaintiff did not merely fail to establish that his reports were
made in “good faith.”71 Rather, the court found that the plaintiff was foreclosed from receiving
protection under Michigan’s whistleblower statute because of his own bad faith actions.72 Wolcott
involved a heavy machinery maintenance mechanic who became disgruntled following an
announcement from his employer that operations would be scaled back.73 Concerned about his
and his coworkers’ job security, Wolcott sent his employer a threatening letter, warning that if he
or his friends were to lose their jobs, he would expose a record of unlawful conduct in which his
employer had engaged.74 The court refused to extend whistleblower protection to Wolcott, stating
that it could not reward use of the whistleblower statute in a purely offensive way by a bad faith
actor.75 This is very different than the reporting activity in which Mr. Obst engaged. Mr. Obst’s
reporting activity was done in the interest of motor vehicle safety, and compliance with federal
regulations;76 at no time did he attempt to blackmail his employer. The Michigan court’s
discussion of a good faith whistleblower was meant as a juxtaposition to the bad faith conduct in
which Wolcott engaged, not to support a searching analysis of the whistleblower’s purpose at the
time he made the report.

Wolcott v. Champion Int’l Corp., 691 F. Supp. 1052 (W.D. Mich. 1987).
Id.
71
Id. at 1065.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 1054.
74
Id. at 1055.
75
Wolcott, 691 F. Supp. at 1065.
76
Obst v. Microtron, Inc., 614 N.W.2d 196, 201 (Minn. 2000).
69
70

The Minnesota court in Obst described the holding in Wolcott as standing for the
proposition that a whistleblower’s burden is not met “where the purpose of the employee, at the
time of the making of reports, was not to protect the public, but to protect the jobs of himself and
his co-workers.”77 This ignores the fact that Wolcott was not merely foreclosed from protection
because his purpose was not to protect the public, but rather because he engaged in bad faith,
extortive behavior that ran directly contrary to the public policy goals served by whistleblower
protection. The court in Obst also refers to the Wolcott court holding that “the good faith
requirement of the whistle-blower statute was not met.”78 This is curious because, as in CEPA,
the Michigan statute in question contains no “good faith” language.79
2. Ramifications of the Strained Reading of Wolcott in Obst
The majority in Obst seemed to create a new purpose element to a whistleblower claim,
one which the dissenting judge in that case stated had never before been adopted and was not
mandated by the language of the statute.80 Justice Gilbert went on to question the propriety of a
panel of judges overturning a jury verdict based upon a contrary finding of fact.81 This purpose
element, nevertheless, took on the “crucial question” status that the majority had ascribed it and
led courts to perform searching analyses of the subjective intent of purported whistleblowers.82
This line of cases developed the theory that if one’s job requires one to make a report, simply

77

Obst, 614 N.W.2d at 202.
Id.
79
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 15.362 (West 2016).
80
Obst, 614 N.W.2d at 206 (Gilbert, J., dissenting).
81
Id.
82
See generally Gee v. Minn. State Colls. and Univs., 700 N.W.2d 548, 555-56 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (faculty
advisor did not have purpose to expose illegality when the sole purpose of her action was to fulfill the
responsibilities of her job); Freeman v. Ace Tel. Ass’n, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1140-41 (D. Minn. 2005) (financial
officer did not have purpose to expose illegality when responsibilities of his job required him to report any
discrepancies in accounting).
78

fulfilling that responsibility would not be enough to establish the requisite purpose which the
statute required. This theory was given explicit approval in the case of Kidwell v. Sybaritic, Inc.83
In Kidwell, the plaintiff worked as in-house council for the defendant company and filed a
series of reports highlighting some concerning practices, urging that his employer stop engaging
in them.84 Specifically, Kidwell made allegations that Sybaritic was engaged in tax evasion, the
unlawful practice of medicine, and obstruction of justice.85 Three weeks later, he was terminated.86
Kidwell’s stated purpose in alerting his employer of his perceived violations of law were to “pull
th[e] company back into compliance” and, thereby, to ensure that further violations of law did not
occur.87 Despite this laudable motive, and Kidwell’s good faith action in attempting to rectify the
situation, the court held that he was excluded from whistleblower protection because his purpose
was not to blow the whistle on the activity, but merely to do his job. 88 Simply put, the court
decided that when an employee is fulfilling the responsibilities of his job, he is not acting with the
necessary purpose to blow the whistle, which the statute requires.89
In reaching this conclusion, the plurality stated that a blanket “job duties” exception could
not apply to the statute, as it does not contain any limiting language in the inclusive definition of
“employee.”90 Despite this, the plurality went on to say that, while the legislature had not defined
“good faith” within the statute, it would apply the purpose analysis developed in Obst.91 Engaging

83

Kidwell v. Sybaritic, Inc., 784 N.W.2d 220 (Minn. 2010).
Id. at 221–22.
85
Id. at 222.
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Id. at 223.
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Id.
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Id. at 231.
89
Kidwell, 784 N.W.2d at 228 (“[W]hen it is the employee’s job to report illegality, there is no basis to infer from
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in this analysis, the plurality explained that whether the reporting activity fell within the
employee’s job duties was a relevant consideration of the employee’s subjective intent, or purpose,
in making the report.92 This amounts to an end-around. Unable to bar a class of employees from
whistleblower protection outright, the court developed a methodology under which that class
would be effectively barred.
For further support of this interpretation of the statutory language at issue, the court looked
to how the federal courts had interpreted a substantially similar federal statute, the Whistleblower
Protection Act of 1989 (“WPA”).93

This statute provided federal employees with similar

whistleblower protections to that of the MWA. The court stated that in the past, it had found
analysis of the WPA instructive to its analysis of the MWA.94 The court focused on two cases in
particular which analyzed the WPA and found that, when reporting was made as part of an
employee’s job duties, their level of protection was reduced.95 These two cases developed the
existence, within the WPA, of a limited implied job duties exception. Specifically, the “normal
channels” of reporting language came from the court in Huffman, which the Minnesota court
extended to their analysis of the state statute.96
The language of Minnesota’s whistleblower protection statute provides protection for an
employee who reports violations to their employer and does not restrict which employees are
entitled to protection.97 Nevertheless, the Minnesota Supreme Court held here that the only way
Kidwell could have engaged in “good faith” whistleblowing activity—activity with the requisite
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purpose—would be if he went outside of the “normal channels” through which his job duties
required him to file reports.98 By placing a higher burden on watchdog employees like Kidwell,
and by removing from them one of their statutorily afforded avenues of recourse, the court has
frustrated the legislature’s broad remedial purpose in effecting the legislation.99
Like the court in Obst, the Kidwell court was not unified. The plurality opinion, discussed
above, was joined by only three justices. A concurrence was filed on behalf of one justice who,
while agreeing that Kidwell was not entitled to protection, arrived at that conclusion on different
grounds.100 Finally, a dissent was filed on behalf of three other justices.101 In this opinion, Justice
Anderson expresses his disapproval of the weight that the plurality gave to the fact that a report
was made as a part of the employee’s job duties, through the normal channels.102 While the
dissenting justice acknowledged that good faith was required (agreeing with the holding in Obst)
and that purpose and subjective intent were properly examined, he disagreed that the above
consideration could be seen as dispositive of the issue.103 Rather, he would have held that an
employee, such as Kidwell, was perfectly capable of reporting in good faith, despite having a duty
to make those same reports.104 Justice Anderson would leave the question of whether the required
subjective intent existed in the hands of the trier of fact, not handed down in a proclamation by a
panel of judges.105 This approach to the question of the subjective intent of the reporter, and
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whether or not he acted in good faith, is more in line with the Michigan court in Wolcott, and more
in line with the broad remedial purpose of the legislation at issue.
3. Impact of Kidwell on the Public Policy Goals of Whistleblower Protection
Quite clearly, carving this limited job duties exception out of Minnesota’s whistleblower
statute frustrates the legislative intent and undercuts the public policy goals sought in its
enactment.106 After this decision, employees in Minnesota, in positions similar to Kidwell’s, are
placed in an unfortunate situation.107 On the one hand, they can report violations of laws or
regulations to their employers through the normal channels established by the normal duties of
their jobs. Taking this course, however, leaves the employee vulnerable to retaliatory action by
his employer. The employers will not have to fear retribution for such retaliation because, under
the Kidwell precedent, those employees did not engage in protected conduct.108 On the other hand,
the employee can go outside of the normal channels and report the violations to the proper
authorities, risking an uncomfortable employment relationship going forward.
Undoubtedly, there will be watchdog employees who take this latter course, justifying the
Minnesota Supreme Court’s approach (to some extent) and bringing to fruition the goals of the
Minnesota legislature. There is also no doubt, however, that many employees will not. People are
naturally self-interested, and a decision to report one’s employer to the authorities will be, in the
judgment of many, contrary to that interest.109 It is a much safer course to not make waves, not
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rock the boat, and not risk one’s livelihood. The prospect of unemployment, even if accompanied
by damages conferred by a successful civil suit, is daunting. If the only avenue open to certain
employees is taking violations to outside authorities, it stands to reason that many employees will
not take that course.110
This is, clearly, in direct contradiction to the stated goals of a whistleblower protection
statute. The purpose of these statutes is to encourage employees to attempt to remedy violations
committed by their employers by providing them with protection from retaliation.111 Instead, for
employees who would not be inclined to go to outside authorities, the Kidwell precedent
discourages employees from taking action. If they were to do so, they would be vulnerable to
retaliation and have no protection whatsoever. By allowing watchdog employees the same level
of protection as any other employee, and by allowing reports made in the course of one’s normal
job duties to constitute protected disclosures, the broad remedial purpose of this type of legislation
would be more fully realized.112
B. Maine
In 1983, the legislature of Maine created a whistleblower statute that is substantially similar
to that of Minnesota, both in language and purpose. The statute, the Maine Whistleblower
Protection Act (“MWPA”), provides, in pertinent part:
1. Discrimination prohibited. No employer may discharge, threaten
or otherwise discriminate against an employee regarding the
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employee's compensation, terms, conditions, location or privileges
of employment because:
A. The employee, acting in good faith, or a person acting on behalf
of the employee, reports orally or in writing to the employer or a
public body what the employee has reasonable cause to believe is a
violation of a law or rule adopted under the laws of this State, a
political subdivision of this State or the United States;
B. The employee, acting in good faith, or a person acting on behalf
of the employee, reports to the employer or a public body, orally or
in writing, what the employee has reasonable cause to believe is a
condition or practice that would put at risk the health or safety of
that employee or any other individual . . .113
Notably, Maine’s whistleblower protection statute also contains the “good faith” language present
in the Minnesota statute.114 Originally, the courts in Maine had interpreted this good faith language
to impart the traditional meaning, standing for the inverse proposition of bad faith. 115 This is
illustrated concisely in the following quote from Gammon v. Crisis Counseling Ctrs., Inc: “The
law it cites on good faith is generally geared towards an assessment of whether the purported
whistleblower made her complaints for the purpose of exposing illegal or unsafe practices. The
Court is unaware of a more precise standard.”116 This is exactly in line with the Michigan court’s
analysis in Wolcott. Thanks to the Minnesota Supreme Court in Kidwell, however, a more precise
standard was injected into the MWPA just nine months later.
In that subsequent case, the appellee cited Kidwell to argue that the MWPA should be
interpreted similarly to how the MWA was in that case.117 Capalbo involved a commercial truck
driver who alleged that, prior to his termination, he had made a number of complaints to his
supervisors regarding his hours worked, which were allegedly in violation of various laws and
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regulations.118 Specifically, Capalbo alleged that he was being under-compensated for overtime
hours, and that he was working in excess of the maximum hours allowed for the type of work he
was engaged in.119 Capalbo’s case was fatally flawed, however. Although he had reported his
concerns to his supervisors at Kris-Way Truck Leasing, they cursorily brushed him off and told
him not to worry about it, which is exactly what he did.120 If Capalbo had refused to work in
excess of the maximum hours allowed for commercial truck drivers and had continued to complain
in the face of this instruction, then he may have been able to state a claim of protected disclosure.121
However, the court never reached this possibility.
Although the court disposed of the whistleblower claim without deciding whether a job
duties exception like the one found in Kidwell would apply, it did briefly discuss the issue.122 KrisWay urged the court to accept the Kidwell and Willis line of reasoning because it was Capalbo’s
responsibility to keep track of his own “hours logs” and to make sure that he was not going over
the statutory maximums.123 Accordingly, it argued that any reports that he made as to excessive
hours were required in the normal course of his job and were made through the normal channels,
thus aligning with the Minnesota precedent.124 The court recited the argument but rendered no
decision as to its merit.125
Two years later, however, in a curious turn of events, Capalbo was used in Winslow v.
Aroostook County to sustain the proposition that “the usual rule in Maine is that a plaintiff's reports
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are not whistleblowing if it is part of his or her job responsibilities to make such reports.”126
Indeed, in Winslow, Capalbo was the only case law interpreting the Maine statute offered to
support this contention. The court, in attempting to bolster the rationality of this “usual rule,”
offered only that it “is also true elsewhere,” citing to Kidwell and Willis.127 In Winslow, the
plaintiff, Dena Winslow, made and distributed a report at the express request of her employer,
which detailed some compliance issues regarding the status of her employment. 128 Winslow
distributed the report to a wider audience than to which she was instructed, an action which upset
her superiors, who viewed it as insubordination.129 She was subsequently terminated.130
As in Capalbo, the court found that the plaintiff’s reporting activity simply did not
constitute whistleblowing.131

This was because, although there were compliance issues,

Winslow’s superiors were actively engaged in attempting to remedy them (evidenced in the fact
that Winslow’s report was created and distributed at the express request of Winslow’s boss).132
This alone would have been fatal to Winslow’s claim. The court, however, decided to articulate
that the “usual rule” in Maine is that an employee is not engaging in protected whistleblowing
when performing job responsibilities.133 This usual rule, however, was based entirely on: 1) the
Capalbo decision; and 2) the application of Kidwell and Willis (which in turn provided the sole
basis for that very same Capalbo decision).134 While the results in these two cases would likely
have been the same had no job responsibilities analysis been undertaken, the resulting precedent
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that it created has the potential to injure watchdog employees in future litigation, foreclosing them
from coverage under the MWPA. In fact, that is precisely what has occurred.135 This shift in the
analysis of whistleblower actions in Maine illustrates the invidious potential for rulings like
Kidwell. It also illustrates the concomitant importance for courts and legislatures to strongly and
affirmatively state why the public policy supporting whistleblower protection requires that it be
afforded to all employees equally.
To its credit, however, the First Circuit recently clarified some of the language used in the
Winslow decision in Harrison v. Granite Bay Care, Inc.136 In that case, the court explained that
while the “usual rule” in Maine is that you are not a whistleblower if you make reports pursuant
to job responsibilities, this is “far from holding” that watchdog employees are “wholly ineligible
for statutory whistleblower protection.”137 While not an outright ban, the court did go on to say
that “job duties may be relevant” to analyzing a whistleblower claim under the MWPA, but that
such duties will not be “dispositive of the question”.138 Whether a report is made pursuant to job
duties is “relevant” because it will speak to the employee’s “motivation” in making the report:
whether they acted as a whistleblower or whether they were simply doing their job. 139 While this
is not a total victory, as many employees will have an uphill battle proving their subjective intent,
this will presumably make it easier for them to make it past summary judgment—and in at least
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one case already has.140 This series of events, and the course that Maine’s whistleblower law took
between the Winslow and Granite Bay decisions, underscores the critical role that judicial clarity
takes in shaping the law.
IV.

States That Extend Whistleblower Protection to Watchdog Employees

Whistleblower protection statutes vary greatly state to state, both in their language and in
how they have been interpreted, but “the unmistakable trend has been the broadening of protections
for employees who blow the whistle.”141 With this in mind, it comes as no surprise that the
majority of states that have addressed the issue of a potential job duties exception to their
whistleblower statutes have declined to adopt such a standard.142 This is good news for employees,
and should be troubling to those states that have ruled otherwise. Below is a brief summary of
how some of these states have addressed this issue.
A. Michigan
As discussed above, protection under Michigan’s whistleblower statute (“Michigan
WPA”) was not extended to Paul Wolcott because the court there determined that his reports
were not made in “good faith.”143 This determination was not reached because Wolcott’s reports
were made pursuant to his job duties, but rather because his reports were made in bad faith.144
Naturally a bad faith actor should not be granted whistleblower protection, which is why courts
have restricted the reach of the Michigan WPA, despite any statutory language referring to
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reports made in good faith.145 As discussed above, however, it is perfectly consistent to exclude
employees acting in bad faith from whistleblower protection while at the same time including
employees who blow the whistle pursuant to their job duties.146
In fact, this is precisely how the courts have interpreted the Michigan WPA. The
Supreme Court of Michigan has clearly stated that the lack of any job duties exception or
limitation within the language of the Michigan WPA “renders irrelevant whether the reporting is
part of the employee's assigned or regular job duties.”147 Not only is there no job duties
exception within the Michigan WPA, the reporter’s motivation in making a report is also “not
relevant to the issue [of] whether a [reporter] has engaged in protected activity.”148 Even without
any explicit direction from the legislature, the courts in Michigan have afforded the Michigan
WPA the broad application that it was intended to enjoy.
B. California
California’s general whistleblower statute is, likewise, applicable to all “employees,” on
its face.149 Despite the lack of any supporting language in the California whistleblower
protection statute (hereinafter “CWPA”) however, courts began to graft a job duties exception
onto it, first by analogy to other whistleblower statutes in the case of Muniz v. UPS, Inc.150 Two
years later, the Muniz decision was expanded upon by a California Court of Appeals in Edgerly
v. City of Oakland, which held that performing one’s job duties cannot be considered protected
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activity under the CWPA.151 In reaching this conclusion the court did not cite to the statute, or to
any legislative history, to support its reasoning. Nonetheless, as the statute did not instruct
otherwise, the court was within its authority to interpret it in this manner.
However, this state of affairs did not last long. During the 2013 session, the California
legislature amended the CWPA to make clear that it was meant to apply to all employees,
“regardless of whether disclosing the information is part of the employee’s job duties.”152 With
this change, California’s legislators made a strong statement to the judiciary that whistleblower
protection under the CWPA is intended for all employees. The message has been clearly
received, with courts extending the reasoning to other whistleblower claims as well, such as
wrongful discharge under the common law public policy tort.153 This is a perfect illustration of
the power of legislative clarity.
C. West Virginia
The West Virginia whistleblower protection act (“WVWPA”) instructs that, in order to
be considered a whistleblower, an employee must make a report in “good faith.”154 Unsatisfied
with this language, however, the West Virginia legislature went a step further and defined “good
faith report” as one that the reporter believe is true and that “is made without malice or
consideration of personal benefit.”155 By clarifying this potentially ambiguous language, the
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West Virginia legislature ensured that no job duties exception would be attached to the statute
where one was not intended.156
This was recently confirmed by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in the case
of Taylor v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Resources.157 In that case, an employee
was terminated after voicing her concerns over what she “believed to be errors or irregularities”
in the process through which her employer was soliciting and procuring bids for an advertising
campaign.158 Reversing a lower court’s order granting summary judgment on behalf of the
defendant, the supreme court of appeals unequivocally announced that “our Whistle-blower Law
contains no job duties exception.”159 However, the court went on to say that the definition of
good faith makes it “implicit . . . that the purpose of a report . . . [is] germane to determining
whether an employee has engaged” in protected activity.160 This illustrates how dangerous
“good faith” language can be in the whistleblower context: even where it is explicitly defined, it
will always invite inquiry into an employee’s subjective intent in making a report.
D. Texas
Under the Texas whistleblower protection act (“TWPA”), in order for a report to
constitute protected activity, it must be made “in good faith.”161 The legislature did not define
good faith within the text of the statute, instead relying on the courts to interpret it broadly, in
accordance with the treatment given to remedial statutes.162 Taking this approach, the Supreme
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Court of Texas defined good faith expansively in Wichita County, Tex. v. Hart.163 The court
explained that the good faith requirement contains both a subjective and an objective
component.164 Therefore, in order to perform a protected activity, an employee has to make a
report with the subjective belief that “the conduct reported was a violation of law,” and that
belief needs to be objectively “reasonable” in light of the circumstances.165 Without any explicit
direction from the legislature, the courts in Texas interpreted the “good faith” language to be
synonymous, essentially, with the “reasonable belief” language from CEPA.166
With this in mind, it is little surprise that there is no job duty exception under the TWPA.
This was addressed in Rogers v. City of Fort Worth, in which a Texas court of appeals held that
the fact that an employee “made [a] report primarily in his role as an employee” did not mean
that the report could not constitute protected activity.167 The court went on to discuss the
Huffman decision (which found that the Federal WPA did contain a job duties exception) and
declined to apply it, stating that “[t]his case is not governed by the WPA” and that the TWPA
was intended to protect “employees who report a violation of law.”168 This is a great example of
a state whistleblower statute having the effect it was designed to have: protecting employees
from retaliation for their protected activities, regardless of who the employee is.169
V.

Congress Overrules the Federal Precedents

Validating the approach taken by the New Jersey court, and striking a serious blow at the
foundation of Kidwell and its progeny, Congress passed the Whistleblower Protection
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Enhancement Act (“WPEA”) in 2012.170

Intended to strengthen and extend whistleblower

protections, one of the most significant amendments dealt directly with the question of a job duties
exception, limited or otherwise.171 The amendment provided:
[I]f a disclosure is made during the normal course of duties of an
employee, the disclosure shall not be excluded from subsection
(b)(8) if any employee who has authority to take, direct others to
take, recommend, or approve any personnel action with respect to
the employee making the disclosure, took, failed to take, or
threatened to take or fail to take a personnel action with respect to
that employee in reprisal for the disclosure.172
Congress clearly disapproved of this job duties carve out and, accordingly, created positive
legislation to ensure that it would no longer have any effect.173
This was made abundantly clear in the case of Day v. Department of Homeland Security.174
In that case, the Merit Systems Protection Board (“MSPB”) was confronted with the question of
whether or not the WPEA could be applied retroactively to cases which were pending prior to the
legislation’s effective date.175 The board found that, while Congress had not specifically attached
retroactive effect, giving it such effect was warranted because the WPEA’s definition of what
constituted a disclosure did not represent a substantive change of law and rather was merely a
clarification.176 The board noted that where the WPA had been ambiguous and left the question
of job duty disclosures open, “[t]he WPEA plainly resolves this ambiguity and explicitly provides
that these types of disclosures are covered under the WPA.”177 Thus, rather than serving as a
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change in law subsequent to Huffman, the WPEA clarified the law and stated that Huffman and its
progeny had misinterpreted and misapplied the WPA. Accordingly, Huffman has been superseded
by statute.178
This deals a serious blow to Kidwell, as well as to the evolving case law in Maine. To the
extent that the courts’ decisions rested on Huffman’s interpretation of the WPA, that support has
vanished.

This leaves the Minnesota precedent on exceedingly shaky footing.

Obst now

represents the only “good law” that supports Kidwell, and as noted above, Obst itself is only
supported by a strained reading of Wolcott.179 Maine is left in an even more unsure state, as the
only remaining support for its decisions is Kidwell.180 Perhaps more significantly then the
disappearance of this support is what this change represents. The WPEA is positive proof that the
legislative intent behind the WPA was to protect employees making reports as a part of their job
duties. Of course, this makes perfect sense when one considers the broad remedial purposes that
whistleblower protection are supposed to provide.
Despite this shift in the federal landscape, Kidwell and its progeny remains good law in
Minnesota and in Maine. This is clearly an issue for watchdog employees in those states who are
left without the protection that whistleblower statutes are designed to provide. They have a duty
to report but, if their employer does not appreciate the contribution, they can feel free to retaliate
without fear of retribution or reprisal.181 This paradigm exists to the detriment to communities and
the public at large, where employer wrongdoing will be less frequently checked and their activities
will be allowed to continue.182 Additionally, as one commentator pointed out, allowing a job duties
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exception to whistleblower protection “creates potential for employer abuse . . . [s]pecifically, by
drafting employees’ job descriptions to include a duty to report unlawful conduct,” thereby making
it more difficult for that employee to contest retaliation based on such reports.183
This is also problematic for watchdog employees in other states that have yet to decide this
issue. If and when such states do confront the issue, they will look to how other states have ruled
for guidance. This was illustrated by the way Maine addressed watchdog employees, citing
Minnesota case law as a primary justification for its rulings.184 This will be especially true in states
whose whistleblower statutes are worded similarly to the MWA and the MWPA and include “good
faith” language. These decisions, and the path that these states have taken, threaten to inspire
courts in other states to create a similar rule and graft onto their state statutes a job duty exclusion
as well.185 This is partly why it is so important for courts, like the New Jersey Supreme Court in
Lippman, to articulate not only why watchdog employees are covered under the plain language of
whistleblower statutes, but also why affording whistleblower protection to watchdog employees
comports with the purpose of such statutes in the first place. By making bold, decisive statements
of this kind, courts can provide other states with compelling justifications for rejecting job duty
exclusions, despite interpreting statutes with slightly different language and articulation.
VI.

Garcetti, the Job Duties Exception, and the Attorney Whistleblower

A job-duties exception exists in another closely related context, established in the case
Garcetti v. Ceballos.186 In that case, the respondent was a deputy district attorney in Los Angeles
County who discovered some issues with an affidavit, which had been critical in obtaining a search
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warrant in a pending case.187 Ceballos took great pains to bring this situation to the attention of
his superiors and to have the case dismissed but, ultimately, the office proceeded with the
prosecution.188 Subsequently, Ceballos suffered a number of negative employment actions,
including a demotion and a transfer.189 Ceballos sued in district court claiming a violation of his
free speech rights under the First Amendment, based on the precedent established by Connick v.
Myers.190 While Ceballos was successful on appeal to the Ninth Circuit, he ultimately lost when
the Supreme Court held that speech made pursuant to an employee’s normal job duties cannot be
protected by the First Amendment.191 The Court explained that such speech merely constituted
‘employee speech,’ not rising to the level of ‘citizen speech.’192
A considerable amount of literature has been published discussing the holding in Garcetti
and the potential for it to broadly impact government employees’ workplace protections, including
claims made under whistleblower protection statutes.193 These concerns are misplaced for a couple
of reasons. First, whistleblower statutes were created with employee protection in mind, and serve
as a response to “the vulnerability of the at-will employee.”194 Therefore, it makes sense for
whistleblower statutes to be applied broadly to all, without certain types of employees excluded.
The First Amendment, on the other hand, was not created in order to protect employees from their
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government employers, but rather to protect all citizens from the government.195 The vastly
different aims of these two sources of employee protection explains why they would not offer
employees the same level of protection.
Secondly, the Garcetti opinion itself essentially disclaimed the application of a job-duties
exception to whistleblower statutes when it referred to such laws as one of the alternative means
by which an employee such as Ceballos could find protection.196 While the dissent noted that this
was unavailing for federal employees due to the Huffman decision, as noted above, Congress has
since amended the WPA in order to provide the protection the majority referred to.197 Congress
ensured that federal whistleblowing employees were protected, and the Court ensured that
Constitutional claims made by such employees would be limited, thereby ensuring that the proper
mechanism would be applied to such claims. The majority wanted employees such as Ceballos to
have recourse, they just believed that overly constitutionalizing the federal workplace was not the
proper means to provide it.
This case, as well as the Kidwell case discussed above, dealt with attorney whistleblowers,
which raises a challenging question for whistleblower protection statutes: should certain
professions be treated differently due to concerns unique to their position?198 The attorney
whistleblower presents two separate issues: (1) the conflict between disclosing violations of the
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law or public policy and the duty of client confidentiality; and (2) the conflict between protecting
an attorney from retaliatory discharge and the right for a person or corporation to discharge their
attorney.199 Similar confidentiality concerns present themselves in the medical field as well.
While these issues complicate the decision to blow the whistle for some employees, there is no
reason to entirely exclude those employees from whistleblower protection. The public benefits
from having well placed employees blow the whistle, and this is no different where attorneys are
concerned.200
VII.

Conclusion

Whistleblower protection statutes are designed to protect the public by incentivizing
employees to speak up when they see their employers acting contrary to either the law or to the
general public interest. Employees, after all, are in many cases the best-situated individuals to see
these actions and remedy them.201 In Lippman, the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized and
affirmed the principle that whistleblower statutes should be read broadly and inclusively, and
should apply to all employees, with no restriction. Doing this will ensure that the purpose of
whistleblower protection will be best served. Unfortunately for some watchdog employees, not
all courts have ruled in this way and some states, like Maine and Minnesota, have seen an exclusion
carved out of their whistleblower statues for such employees.
Going forward, state legislatures should amend their whistleblower statutes to positively
confirm that they are meant to apply to all employees, watchdog or otherwise. This will foreclose
courts from creating exclusions like the ones currently in place in Minnesota and Maine. Courts
in those states should overrule the harmful precedents that have been created and, in doing so,
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confirm the broad public policy justifications for why whistleblower protection exists in the first
place. Courts in other states should do so as well to add instructive force to their rulings.
Ultimately, this will lead to a better-protected workforce, more accountable employers, and a
public that is less negatively impacted by employer abuses.

